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countries such as Bangladesh.
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Summary  findings
Formal regulation of industrial pollution  control  communities successfully  pressure plants to abate
standards has been hampered  in some developing  pollution even if they have little or no support from
countries by the absence of a clear regulatory framework,  formal regulation. High local income is a powerful
by limited institutional capacity, and by limited  predictor  of effective informal regulation.
information on emissions. For many manufacturing  The authors also find that policy matters. Privatization,
facilities in developing economies, the government-  to the extent  that it increases plant efficiency, can
imposed "price of pollution"  is zero.  significantly improve environmental performance. As
Yet Hartman,  Huq, and Wheeler find strong evidence  private ownership, competitiveness, and per capital
that despite weak or nonexistent  formal regulation and  incomes rise, communities may be in a better position to
enforcement of environmental standards, many plants in  exert strong local pressure on polluting facilities to clean
South and Southeast Asia are clean. Of course, many  up production.
plants are also among the world's worst polluters. To  The government may need to intervene to prevent
account for the extreme variation among plants, the  environmental injustice in communities whose citizens
authors review evidence from a survey of pollution  are mostly poor, poorly educated, or members of
abatement by 26 pulp and paper plants in four countries:  marginalized minority groups (and hence less capable of
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Thailand.  applying local pressure on firms and less likely to be
They find that the level of pollution abatement is  knowledgeable about pollution). To compensate,
significantly affected by three factors. Abatement is:  national regulators may want to consider strategies for
* Positively associated with scale and competitiveness.  improving participation in pollution  control in those
* Negatively associated with public ownership.  communities, and for targeting regulation to the
•  Unaffected by foreign links (in ownership or  problems of poor communities.
financing).
A clear source of interplant  differences is the level of
community pressure, or informal regulation. Some
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Developing  countries,  particularly  those  in Asia,  are  fast
adopting  industrial  pollution  control  standards  similar  to those
in developed  countries.  However,  formal  regulation  has  been
greatly  hampered  by the absence  of clear  and  legally  binding
rules;  limited  institutional  capacity;  lack of appropriate
equipment  and  trained  personnel;  and  inadequate  information  on
emissions.  At present,  the government-imposed  'price of
pollution'  is nearly  zero  for many  manufacturing  facilities  in
these  economies.
A  conventional  analysis  would  predict  highly  pollution-
intensive  production  under  such conditions.  However,  our
research  has uncovered  strongly  contradictory  evidence.  Despite
weak  or nonexistent  formal  regulation  and enforcement,  there  are
many  clean  plants  in the developing  countries  of South  and
Southeast  Asia.  Of course,  there  are also many  plants  which  are
among  the  world's  most  serious  polluters.  What  explains  such
extreme  interplant  variation?  This paper  reviews  the  evidence
from  a survey  of pollution  abatement  by  26 pulp  and paper  plants
in four  countries:  Bangladesh,  India,  Indonesia  and Thailand.
Our  analysis  incorporates  three  sets of  factors  which  may
affect  the pollution  intensity  of an industrial  process:
Relevant  plant  characteristics  may  include  choice  of technology,
vintage,  ownership,  management  quality,  available  human  resources
and  technical  expertise.  Firms'  responsiveness  to pressure  for
abatement  may  also vary  significantly  with  economic
considerations:  input  prices,  profitability,  market
characteristics,  availability  of information  on abatement
technology,  and  financing  possibilities.  Finally,  plants  may
adapt  to external  pressure  from government  regulators,  buyers  or
investors,  and neighboring  communities  which  suffer  damage  from
pollution.
Our  results  show  that all  three  factors  play  significant
roles.  Abatement  is positively  associated  with  scale  and
competitiveness;  negatively  associated  with  pubic  ownership;  and
unaffected  by foreign  links  (in ownership  or financing).
Community  pressure,  or  informal  regulation,  emerges  as a clear
source  of interplant  differences.  Under  some circumstances,
communities  successfully  pressure  plants  to abate  even  if little
or no support  is available  from  formal  regulation.  Our  results
suggest  that  local  income  is a powerful  predictor  of effective
informal  regulation.  We also  find that existing  formal
regulation  has  measurably  beneficial  effects,  even when  it is
weakly-developed.
iThe  main message  of our  results  is a hopeful  one  for
sustainable  development.  Clean  production  is not  uncommon  in
very  poor  countries  such as Bangladesh.  Even  in the absence  of
formal  regulation,  large,  efficient,  domestically-owned  plants
operating  near  relatively  affluent  communities  have  proven
capable  of excellent  environmental  performance.  There  is clearly
no insurmountable  barrier  to clean  production  in poor  countries.
Our  strong  results  on ownership,  competitiveness  and  income
also  show  that policy  matters  a great  deal  for clean  production.
The  current  wave  of privatization  implies  declining  significance
for the pollution  intensity  of public  enterprises.  Deregulation
during  the  1980's  has presumably  increased  plant-level  efficiency
in the private  sector,  with  significant  improvements  in
environmental  performance.  Per capita  incomes  are  now  advancing
steadily  in many Asian  and Latin  American  countries,  raising  the
possibility  of stronger  local  pressure  on many  polluting
facilities.
In the  latter  context,  however,  we must  introduce  a
cautionary  note.  Our  results  suggest  that  communities  whose
citizens  are  mostly  poor,  poorly  educated  or members  of
marginalized  minority  groups  may  have  little  ability  to use  the
available  channels  of informal  regulation.  Significance  for
these  factors  would  establish  a clear  case of  'environmental
injustice.'  To compensate,  national  regulators  may want  to
consider  strategies  for enhancing  community  participation  in
pollution  control,  as well  as targeting  of regulation  on the
problems  of poor  communities.
ii1.  INTRODUCTION
Industrial  pollution  has  become  a serious  problem  in many
developing  countries.  Its costs  include  serious  damage  to human
health  and  ecosystems,  and direct  economic  costs  for households
and  businesses.'  During  the past  decade,  many  governments  have
begun  responding  by setting  up regulatory  institutions  and
standards  for air  and water  quality. 2 Existing  regulatory
systems  have  used  (singly or  in combination):  pollution  charges;
tradable  and nontradable  permits;  concentration-  and volume-based
effluent  standards;3 technology  standards;4 and environmental
provisions  in investment  licensing.5
Such  systems  have  often  been  plagued  by monitoring  and
Calkins et al. (1994)  estimate the yearly  health damage from air and
water  pollution  in Jakarta,  Indonesia  alone  to be  in excess  of  $500  million.
Margulis  (1992)  documents a probable IQ loss of several points for thousands
of  children  exposed  to airborne  lead  in Mexico  City,  and  similar  findings  for
Bangkok  have  prompted  the  government  of Thailand  to mandate  an  immediate
switch  to unleaded  gasoline.
2  See Wheeler  (1992)  for a summary of the 'stages  of regulatory
development,' as suggested by the history of several industrial and developing
countries.  Dasgupta  et.  al.  (1995) have  recently  attempted  to quantify
international  differences  in environmental  policy  and performance.
3  A  concentration  standard  is specified  as an intensity  in the medium  of
release  (e.g., allowable  kilograms  of biological  oxygen  demand  per  kiloliter
of waste  water).  A volume  standard  is specified  as an intensity  per  unit  of
output  (e.g., allowable  kilograms  of biological  oxygen  demand  per  ton of wood
pulp).
4  These  specify  actual  pollution  control  equipment  to be  installed.
5  These  have  included  concentration,  volume  and  technology  standards.enforcement  problems  in developing  countries.  Resource  scarcity
may  prevent  policy  makers  from establishing  comprehensive
monitoring  procedures.  Moreover,  the enforcement  of
environmental  standards  generally  remains  very  weak.6 Under  such
conditions,  a conventional  analysis  would  predict  high pollution
loads  from plants  in pollution-intensive  sectors.
In fact,  a small  but  growing  body  of empirical  work  suggests
that  this proposition  is not  correct.  In a small  survey
exercise,  Huq  and Wheeler  (1992) found  that  some  fertilizer  and
pulp  mills  in Bangladesh  are quite  clean  by international
standards,  while  others  are very  heavy  polluters.  Plant-level
emissions  inventories  in Philippines,  Thailand  and  Indonesia  have
suggested  similar  disparities.
For  example,  Figures  1 and 2 compare  a sample  of
approximately  100 plants  from the Metro  Manila  area  in
Philippines  with  a similar-sized  sample  from  two  industrial  areas
in the  Bangkok  industrial  region.  The bar  charts  depict  the
relative  frequency  of biological  oxygen  demand  (DOD) removal
6  O'Connor  (1994) notes:  "In several  of the  [Asian]  countries  studied
here,  the  monitoring  problem  is compounded  by weak  enforcement.  In short,  when
violators  of  standards  are  detected,  if penalised  at all  they  often  face  only
weak  sanctions.  In other  instances,  polluters  are  exempted  from  fines  either
on grounds  of financial  hardship  or because  the violators  wield  undue
political  influence.  Perhaps  the most  pervasive  problem  is that,  even  when
fines  are  levied,  they  are  frequently  so low  in real  terms  that  they  have
little  if any  deterrent  value."  (p. 94)
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7 Clearly,  these  results
contradict  the  stereotype.  At least  one-third  of the plants  in
the Manila  sample  are  removing  BOD  at high  rates,  and many  Thai
plants  seem to be running  near  OECD  standards.  Approximately  50%
of the Thai  factories  in the  sample  are  removing  over  90% of
their  BOD  from  the waste  stream,  and  70-80%  are  removing  70% or
more.  8
Indonesia  is another  Southeast  Asian  economy  with
historically  weak  regulation.  Nonetheless,  recently-gathered  data
reveal  the  same pattern  (Afsah, 1995).  Figures  3 and  4 present
distributions  of BOD  concentrations  relative  to U.S.  and
Indonesian  standards  for  large  samples  of Indonesian  pulp/paper
and  textile  mills.  In each  case,  the  Indonesian  standard  is
several  times  that  of its U.S.  equivalent.  While  the U.S.
Environmental  Protection  Agency  is well-staffed  and has  operated
for over  twenty  years,  the  Indonesian  national  regulatory  agency
(BAPEDAL)  is  quite  new,  operates  with  a small  staff,  and  has
little  power  to punish  plants  which  are not  in compliance  with
existing  regulations.  Nevertheless,  the actual  distribution  of
7  Organic water pollutants are oxidized by naturally-occuring micro-
organisms. Biological oxygen demand (BOD)  removes dissolved oxygen from the
water and can seriously damage some fish species which have adapted to the
previous dissolved oxygen level. Organic water pollutants can also accelerate
the growth  of algae,  which  will  crowd  out other  plant  species.  The  eventual
death  and  decomposition  of the algae  is another  source  of oxygen  depletion  as
well  as noxious  smells  and  unsightly  scum.  The most  common  measure  for  BOD  is
the  amount  (kg.) of oxygen  used  by micro-organisms  to oxidize  the  organic
waste  in a standard  sample  of pollutant  during  a five-day  period  (hence,  '5-
day  BOD').
8  Sources:  World  Bank  consultant  reports.
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5effluent  concentrations  in Indonesian  plants  is extremely  broad,
overlapping  both  U.S.  and  Indonesian  standards.  Approximately
two-thirds  of the plants  are  in compliance  with  Indonesian
standards,  and one-third  would  be in compliance  with U.S.
standards.
Thus,  evidence  from  South  and  Southeast  Asia  indicates  great
variation  in plants'  environmental  performance  regardless  of the
state  of formal  regulation.  In Brazil,  Seroa  da Motta,  et al.
(1993) have  found  a similarly  broad  pattern  of variation  in BOD
removal  across  Brazilian  states.  Even  in North  America,
relatively  high average  performance  masks  a surprising  degree  of
variation  .9
Why  should  such broad  variations  exist,  even  in countries
where  regulation  is weak?  Most  explanations  have  relied  on
anecdotes  (Birdsall  and Wheeler,  1993)  or on work  which  relates
national  policies  to changes  in the balance  between  "dirty"  and
"clean"  sectors  or technologies  across  countries  (Birdsall  and
Wheeler,  1993;  Martin  and  Wheeler,  1992;  Huq  et al.,  1993).  The
latter  work,  however,  relies  on sector-  and  technology-specific
pollution  intensities  estimated  from U.S.  data  and  does  not
reflect  actual  emissions  in other  countries.  More  systematic
evidence  for developing  countries  is just beginning  to emerge.
In a recent  econometric  analysis  of BOD  emissions  from
9  Three years ago, a California coastal pulp mill was fined and forced
to install abatement equipment after local surfers developed skin lesions from
contact with its untreated raw effluent in the Pacific. Laplante and Rilstone
(1994)  note that BOD and SS (suspended  solids) pollution from pulp and paper
mills in Quebec violates environmental standards at least 38% of the time.
6Indonesian  factories,  Pargal  and Wheeler  (1995) find  that  several
plant  characteristics  significantly  affect  pollution  intensity.
These  include  operating  scale,  vintage,  efficiency  and  ownership.
Their  results  are  also  consistent  with widespread  'informal
regulation:'  Where  the  state  functions  poorly  as a regulatory
agent,  local  communities,  under  some circumstances,  have  struck
their  own  Coasian  bargains  with  neighboring  factories.  Leverage
in negotiations  is provided  by social  pressure  on workers  and
managers;  adverse  publicity;  the threat  (or use)  of violence;  or
recourse  to civil  law.
While  the Pargal/Wheeler  results  are  certainly  suggestive,
they  are  subject  to some  important  caveats.  First,  the  sample  is
limited  to one country  (albeit spread  across  a highly  varied  set
of provinces).  Second,  the sample  plants  are  spread  across  many
sectors;  sector  controls  are  limited  to dummy  variables  for a few
well-represented  activities.  Third,  only  end-of-pipe  emissions
are  observed.  Thus,  it is not clear  how much  of the variation  in
BOD  is due  to actual  abatement  and how much  is due to subsectoral
variation  in product  lines.  This  is particularly  important  for
evaluation  of the  informal  regulation  hypothesis.  Higher
pollution  intensity  might  simply  reflect  the  differential
location  of highly  polluting  facilities  in poor  communities,  not
explicit  abatement  efforts.  This would  certainly  reflect
differential  community  power,  but would  not  imply  that  such power
provides  important  leverage  for pollution  control.
In this paper,  we reverse  the Pargal/Wheeler  approach.
7Rather  than  estimating  emissions  equations  across  many  sectors  in
one  country,  we analyze  explicitly-observed  abatement  activity  in
one  sector  --  pulp  and  paper  --  across  several  countries.  We
also  distinguish  between  possible  Pigouvian  and  Coasion
interpretations  of abatement.  In Section  2 of  the paper,  we
review  the  Pigouvian  and Coasian  approaches  and  introduce  the
distinction  between  'formal'  and  'informal'  regulation.  Section
3 presents  our analysis  of the plant-level  data.  Section  4
summarizes  the paper.
2.  PIGOUVIAN  vs.  COASIAN  REGULATION
The  Pigouvian  approach  places  responsibility  for an
externality  on its generator  (the polluter)  and  imposes  a
pollution  tax  (effluent  fee) as the policy  prescription.  Its
optimality  rests  on a set of restrictive  neoclassical
assumptions.10  Most  importantly,  the Pigouvian  approach  does  not
address  the reciprocal  nature  of externalities.  Nor  does  it
analyze  the abatement  behavior  that will  be induced  by the
Pigouvian  tax.
In contrast,  the Coasian  approach  assumes  that  an
externality  is reciprocal  (i.e., both  polluter  and pollutee  cause
10  See Baumol [1972].  This optimality of the Pigouvian tax holds whether
participants merge or operate independently.  Buchanan  [1969)  and Davis and
Whinston [19731  question this optimality in the case of monopoly and/or
oligopoly.  However, for a workably large number of participants, the
Pigouvian results are unassailable.
8the externality" 1 ); that legal rules and institutions should
change to efficiently internalize the externality; and that
policy makers should focus upon the dynamic issue of eliminating
(abating)  the externality.  By incorporating these issues into
the analysis, the Coasian approach arrives at optimal policy
prescriptions which generally dominate the Pigouvian results.12
Because formal regulation is often weak, we hypothesize that
abatement efforts in developing countries may have significant
Coasian elements.  At the core of this issue lies the question of
effective political constituency:  Have centralized governmental
regulations and statutes (formal  regulatory initiatives) or
localized citizen pressure and negotiations (informal  regulatory
initiatives) been more important as inducements to observed
abatement efforts  ?
13
It  More specifically, the externality would not exist if the pollutee had
located elsewhere.  In the law, this is called "coming to the nuisance".  See
Cooter and Ulen  [1988],  p. 181.
12  See Brown  [1973];  Calabresi [1970);  Coelho [1975];  Coase [19601;
Demsetz  [1963,1967,1972];  Diamond [1974];  Hartman [1982);  McKean  [19701.
13  In developed countries, we would expect to find that political and
social pressure for pollution abatement are communicated through formal
governing and regulating agencies.  In developing countries, however, the
formal political and regulatory infrastructure is less well-developed.  In
these situations, political constituencies  must sometimes go directly to the
source of the problem.  See Huq and Wheeler (1993)  for examples from
Bangladesh.
93.  EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS
Our  empirical  analysis  makes  use  of data  gathered  as part  of
a 1992 World  Bank  field  survey  of 26 plants  in the pulp  and paper
industry.  The plants  were  distributed  throughout  Bangladesh,
India,  Indonesia  and  Thailand.  The  survey  gathered  the  following
information  about  each  plant:
*  The process  technology  in place.  Four processes  were
in operation:  stone  ground;  soda;  kraft  sulphate  and
sulphite;  and waste-paper-based  pollution.  In our
analysis,  we characterize  the  stone  ground  process  as
"clean" because  it does  not use  polluting  chemicals.
*  Ownership  in three  categories:  state-owned  enterprises
(SOE), domestic  privately-owned  enterprises  (POE)  and
multinational  enterprises  (MNC).
*  Characterization  of geographical  location  by degree  of
urbanization:  Big  city  (population  greater  than  1
million),  small  city  (population  less than  1 million),
or rural  area.
The  size  of the plant  measured  by  total  employment.
*  Whether  foreign  financing  and/or  donor  aid  supported
plant  construction.
*  The  existence  of local  pressure  to abate  observed
pollution.
*  The  cost  competitiveness  of the plant  relative  to other
plants  in the  domestic  market.
*  The  pollution  abatement  efforts  undertaken  by the
plant.  The  focus  of this measure  for  the most part  is
end-of-pipe  abatement.
To  this data  base,  we have  added  the  following  information
about  the  economic  and  regulatory  environment  in which  each plant
operated:
10*  The  standard  of living  in the  country,  measured  as per
capita  income  at purchasing  power  parity;
*  The  extent  of formal  emissions  regulation;
*  Indices  of informal  regulatory  pressure.
The  available  information  set  does not  include  the  pollution
abatement  efforts  undertaken  by other  local  parties  in response
to pollution  at the plant.  Thus,  our  results  can  only provide
suggestive  evidence  about  the significance  of Coasian  elements.
3.1 Model  Variables
For  this  analysis,  we have  used  the available  information  to
develop  indices  of abatement  efforts;  formal  regulatory  pressures
at the national  and  local  levels;  informal  regulatory  pressure;
and other  relevant  factors.  Variable  definitions  are provided  in
Box  1.  The  informal  regulatory  set has the  following  dimensions:
*  Per  capita  income,  a proxy  for  local  valuation  of
pollution  damage;  political  awareness;  education;  and
citizen  activism.
*  The ease  with which  a given  polluter  can be  identified
and  subjected  to informal  pressures,  measured  by the
size  of the  city or rural  area  in which  the plant
operates.
*  The  competitiveness  and profitability  of the plant,
measuring  its willingness  to accept  abatement
responsibility;  its ability  to abate;  and  its
bargaining  strength  in localized  Coasian  negotiations.
*  The  size of the aggregate  social  willingness  to pay  to
eliminate  the externality,  measured  as the  size of the
11BOX 1:  VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
ABATEMENT EFFORT
An integer score that summarizes both the number of abatement actions undertaken by the plant and the
relative costliness of those actions. Ten actions are possible,  including installation of electrostatic
precipitators or filter bags, lagoon facilities, aerobic treatment, anaerobic treatment,  clarifier,  chemical
treatment of wastes (coagulant/focculin), water recycling, liquor recovery,  compaction of solid waste and
general housekeeping procedures.  The score can range in value from  1 to 36.  In the data, the score
actually ranges from 0 to 32.  We describe the development of this variable in greater detail in Appendix A.
INFORMAL REGULATORY PRESSURES
LOCI  =  1 if plant location is within a city of more than 1 million residents; 0 otherwise.
LOC2  =  1 if plant location is within a city or town of less than I million residents; 0 otherwise.
LOC1  =  LOC2 =  0 if plant location is rural.
EMP  = total employment at plant.
PCI =  per capita income in the country.
COMPETE  =  2 if the firm is above average in terms of competitiveness; 1 if the firm is average; 0  if the
firm is below average.
PRESSURE  =  1 if the plant was subjected to localized pressure to abate observed pollution; 0 otherwise.
FORMAL REGULATORY PRESSURES
NATREG =  an index summarizing the degree of formal regulation at the national level in the home country
of the survey plant: 0 if no environmental regulations;  1 if some generalized enabling statutes but no real
effluent guidelines or technology standards; 2 if mandated standards but no monitoring or enforcement; 3 if
mandated standards, ambient monitoring and no enforcement; 4 if mandated standards, ambient and some
site monitoring, and some enforcement; 5 if mandated standards, systematic ambient and site monitoring,
and systematic enforcement.
PROVREG =  an index summarizing the degree of formal regulation affecting the surveyed plant at the
provincial level: -1 if provincial regulations are less stringent than national regulations; 0 if provincial
regulations are no more stringent than national regulations;  1 if provincial regulations are more stringent than
national regulations.
FORMREG  =  an index summarizing the strength of formal regulatory pressures affecting the surveyed
plant, including both national and provincial regulations and defined as NATREG +  PROVREG.
OTHER FACTORS
SOE  =  1 if the plant is a state-owned enterprise; 0 otherwise.
MNC  =  1 if the plant is a joint venture with foreign investment; 0 otherwise.
SOE  =  MNC  =  0 if the plant is domestic and a privately owned-enterprise (POE)
FORFIN  =  1 if any foreign donor financing was used for the installation, where  donors include the World
Bank and OECD countries; 0 otherwise.
AGE =  Age of the plant.
CLEAN  =  1 if the manufacturing process at the plant is either waste paper or some stone-ground process; 0
otherwise (the process is either soda, kraft or sulphite).
12city  in which  the plant  is located.
More  detailed  descriptions  of the  abatement  index  and
selected  independent  variables  are provided  in the Appendix.
3.2  Survey  Results
3.2.1  Ownership
Prior  to the  survey,  we believed  that plant  ownership  would
be an important  determinant  of abatement  effort.  Everything  else
being  equal,  we expected  state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs) to be
larger  than private-sector  counterparts  (certainly  relative  to
local  privately-owned  enterprises  --  POEs)  and  less efficient  in
material  use.  We hypothesized  that both  of these  factors  would
increase  pollution,  ceteris  paribus,  and  the need  for abatement
efforts. 1 4 On the other  hand,  we also  recognized  that  state-
owned  enterprises  have  frequently  been  more  insulated  from
regulatory  pressures  than  their  private-sector  counterparts.
The  decomposition  of our  sample  by ownership  (and country)
is presented  in Table  lA.  Roughly  50%  of our plants  are
domestic,  privately-owned  enterprises  (POEs); only  four are  owned
by multinational  corporations  (MNCs); and about  38% are  SOEs.  In
Table  lB, we present  the average  size  of these  plants.  In India
and Bangladesh  the SOEs  are  larger,  on average,  than the  POEs.  In
Thailand,  however,  they are not.
14  While size may increase the need for abatement efforts overall, it can
also reduce the average cost of abatement because of scale economies in waste
treatment.
13TABLE 1A
DISTRIBUTION (NUMBER) OF PLANTS BY OWNERSHIP AND COUNTRY
Private  l
Country  Public  Domestic  Foreign  TOTAL
Bangladesh  3  1  4
India  3  4  2  9
Indonesia  4  5  1  10
Thailand  2  1  3
TOTAL  10  12  4  26
TABLE 1B
AVERAGE SIZE OF PLANTS (MEASURED BY EMPLOYMENT)
BY OWNERSHIP AND COUNTRY
Ownership
Country  Public  Private  Multinational  TOTAL
Indonesia  1504.5  2225.4  3081  2022.6
Thailand  385  400  390
India  1330  289.5  945  922.7
Bangladesh  2737  250  |  1908
TOTAL  1720.2  1272.6  |  1342.7  |  1459.9
TABLE 2
ABATEMENT ACTIVITY (MEAN, MEDIAN, MAXIMUM AND
MINIMUM SCORE) BY OWNERSHIP
Ownership  Minimum  Median  |  Maximum  Mean  |_No.  of Ohs._|
Public  0  7.5  32  10.2  10
Private  1  13.5  31  16.2  12
Foreign  13  20  28  20.3  4
14During  the  survey,  the management  of the  POEs  seemed  more
aware  of and  responsive  to existing  and expected  environmental
regulations  than  did their  SOE  counterparts.  The  largest,  most
competitive  and profitable  POE plants,  such as those  of the  Sinar
Mas  group  in Indonesia  and Thai  Paper  in Thailand,  have
aggressively  controlled  water  and  air pollution.  In fact,  these
particular  POEs appeared  to abate  more  aggressively  than  many
MNCs.  However,  our  results  suggest  very  active  abatement  efforts
by MNCs.  Certainly,  local  regulation  has  something  to do with
this.  It also  reflects  the MNCs'  attempts  to standardize  their
operations  across  the globe.  Their  production  techniques  must
often  meet  developed-country  environmental  standards. 5
Table  2 summarizes  our  findings,  presenting  the  abatement
scores  of the  three  groups  of plants  by ownership  class.  Based
on both  median  and mean  scores,  state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs)
have  been  least  aggressive  in abating  pollution,  in spite  of the
fact  that the  SOEs  are, on average,  the  largest  plants.  The
strength  of this  result  is compounded  by the  fact that  average
abatement  costs  are generally  lower  for larger  plants.  The  mean
POE has  undertaken  approximately  60% more  abatement  effort  than
the mean  SOE, while  the mean  MNC  (in an admittedly  tiny  sample)
is In our sample, we should note that MNCs are cleaner only in end-of-
pipe abatement, not in original choice of production technique.  We have
classified alternative manufacturing processes as "clean" if the process is
either waste paper or some stone-ground  process and "dirty" if the process is
either soda, kraft or sulphite.  Using these categories,  we find the following
distribution of plants by ownership and manufacturing process:  SOEs (1  clean
and 9 dirty); POEs (5  clean and 7 dirty); MNCs  (1  clean and 3 dirty).  In this
small sample, at least, the POEs have more consistently selected clean
processes than have the MNCs.
15has undertaken  approximately  25i more  abatement  effort  than  the
mean  POE.
3.2.2  Indices  of Informal  Regulation
Section  3.1  identifies  several  factors  that we believe
affect  the  strength  of informal  regulatory  pressures  on polluting
facilities.  These  factors  include  per  capita  income  (proxying
political  awareness,  literacy,  activism  and political  power);  the
size  of the  city  in which  the plant  is located  (measuring  both
the ease  with  which  the polluter  can be identified  and  subjected
to informal  pressures  and  the  size of the  aggregate  social
willingness  to pay  to eliminate  the externality);  and  the
competitiveness  and profitability  of the plant  (measuring  both
its willingness  and  ability  to accept  and  undertake  abatement
responsibility  and  its bargaining  strength  in localized  Coasian
negotiations 6 ).
Tables  3 and 4 summarize  the abatement  scores  of plants
grouped  by national  per  capita  income  (in purchasing  power
parity),  location,  plant  competitiveness  and degree  of past
pressure  from  local  communities.
* Income:  There  is a strong  positive  relationship  between
per  capita  income  and  abatement  effort  in our  sample.
* Location:  We find  an inverse  relationship  between  city
size  and abatement  efforts;  plants  in rural  areas  undertake
significantly  more  abatement  than plants  in small  and  large
cities.  To the extent  that abatement  is induced  by regulatory
16  Thus, both size and competitiveness have countervaIling elements.
16TABLE 3
ABATEMENT  EFFORTS,  BY INCOME,  LOCATION  AND COMPETITIVENESS
Country  (Per
Capita  No.  of
Income)  Min  Med  Max  Mean  Obs.
Bangladesh  3  6  8  5.8  4
($700)  _
India  0  13  30  14.3  9
($786)
Indonesia  1  10.5  32  14.6  10
($1714)  . .
Thailand  19  29  31  26.3  3
($2800)__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _
Location  Rural area  0  23  32  19.1  13
Small town  9  16  19  15  4
Big city  1  5  14  5.7  7
Compet-  Below  average
itiveness  0  7.5  32  8.9  8
Average  1  13  28  12  9
Above
.___________  average  4  26  31  23.8  |  8
TABLE  4
ABATEMENT  ACTIVITY  BY COUNTRY  AND PRESENCE  OF
LOCAL  PRESSURE  (INFORMAL  REGULATION)
J_____________C  ountry  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Pressure  jIndonesia Thailand  J India  Bangladesh  TOTAL
0  12.7  19  11.2  5  11.1
1  19  30  18.2  8  19.8
TOTAL  14.6  26.3  14.3  5.7  14.5
17response  to perceived  aggregate  willingness  to pay,  we would  have
expected  the opposite  result.  That  is,  abatement  efforts  would
be greatest  in the  largest  cities,  ceteris  paribus.  Our  finding
therefore  suggests  a strong  effect  for ease  of identification:  in
rural  areas  polluting  activities  are more  obvious,  while  they  are
lost  among  all  the other  polluters  in large  cities.  Significant
power  for  informal  regulation  is implied  by this  finding,  but  we
should  also  note  a parallel  result  which  reveals  a weakness  of
partially-informed  community  action.  Local  communities  can
pressure  plants  to abate  once  they have been  installed,  but  they
have  little  ability  to compare  processes  before  installation.  We
find  an apparently  powerful  countervailing  effect  in process
technology  selection:  'dirty' processes  are  far more  common  in
rural  areas.  The  distribution  is as follows:  rural  location  (0
clean,  13 dirty);  small  city  (2 clean;  2 dirty);  large  city  (5
clean;  2 dirty).
* Competitiveness:  The more  competitive  (i.e., profitable)
plants  undertake  more  aggressive  abatement,  apparently  because
they  can  afford  it.17
* Pressure:  While  we have  used per  capita  income  and
location  to proxy  the  existence  of informal  regulatory  pressure,
we have  also been  able  to obtain  a more  direct  measure  of
localized  pressure.  Specifically,  9 of our  26 plants  reported
that  they  had  experienced  pressure  and  complaints  from  local
17  We had  originally  hypothesized  that  export-oriented  plants  might  abate
more  because  of sensitivity  to  'green  consumerism'  in richer  importing
economies.  However,  we found  no  such  effect.
18citizen  groups  concerning  plant  pollution.  We use  a dummy
variable  (PRESSURE)  to identify  these  plants.  Table  4 summarizes
the  abatement  activities  of the  sample  plants  differentiated  by
PRESSURE  and  country.  In all cases,  those  plants  experiencing
localized  pressure  undertook  significantly  more  abatement
activities  afterward.
3.2.3  Indices  of Formal  Regulation
Finally,  we present  summaries  of abatement  efforts  for
plants  facing  alternative  levels  of formal  regulatory  pressure,
which  we differentiate  at the national  and provincial  levels.
Table  5 summarizes  our  findings.  In Table  5A, we present  average
scores  for our  national  regulatory  index.  As national  regulatory
pressure  increases  from  level  1 to level  3, we find  that  the
average  abatement  score  rises  from 5.75  to 16.09.  In Table  5B,
we examine  the  scores  of plants  within  each country
differentiated  by the  relative  strength  of provincial
environmental  regulation.
We  find differences  across  provinces  in Indonesia  and  India
only.  In Indonesia,  those  plants  facing  provincial  regulations
more  stringent  than  the national  regulations  reveal  greater
abatement  activities  through  considerably  higher  scores.  In
India,  we find  that plants  facing  below-average  provincial
regulations  reveal  less abatement  effort.  However,  plants  facing
above-average  pressure  do not  reveal  greater  abatement  effort
than  plants  at national  average  levels.  Finally,  Table  5C
summarizes  the average  scores  for plants  grouped  by our  variable
19TABLES 5A-5C:
ABATEMENT ACTIVITY BY MEASURES OF FORMAL REGULATION
TABLE 5A
VARIATION BY NATIONAL REGULATION
National Regulation  Mean Score
1  5.75
3  16.0
TOTAL  14.5
TABLE 5B
VARIATION DUE TO PROVINCIAL REGULATION
l  _____________  |  _____________  C  ountry  I
Provincial  _  _  1
Regulation  Indonesia  Thailand  India  Bangladesh  TOTAL
-1  7.3  7.3
0  12.8  26.3  18.3  5.7  14.6
1  17.2  17.3  17.2
TOTAL  14.6  26.3  14.3  5.7  14.5
TABLE 5C
VARIATION BY FORMAL REGULATION: NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL
Formal
Regulation  Mean Score
1  5.7
2  7.3
3  17.5
4  17.2
TOTAL  14.5
20summarizing  both  national  and provincial  formal  regulation.  As
formal  regulations  are  strengthened  from 1 to 3, we find  that  the
average  score  rises  from  5.75 to 17.58.  However,  the  average
scores  for plants  facing  values  of 3 and  4 are  essentially  the
same.  This  latter  result  is due  entirely  to the  non-
responsiveness  of plants  in India.
3.3 Correlations
Table  6 presents  the  correlations  among  those  independent
variables  that we have  found  to be important.  The  state-owned
plants  (SOEs) are the  least  competitive  in the  sample
(r =  -0.5012)  and the  most  likely  to be financed  by donor  aid1 8
(r =  0.5447);  plants  with  cleaner  technologies  are  usually
located  in larger  cities  (r =  0.5238);  our measure  of formal
regulation  (FORMREG)  is orthogonal  (r =  0.0000)  to our  single
measure  of informal  regulation  (PRESSURE);  correlated  with  per
capita  income  (ln PCI:  r = 0.3987)  but  only weakly  correlated
with  our other  proxies  for informal  regulation:  LOC1,  LOC2  and
COMPETE  (r = 0.0000,  0.2795  and  -0.2004  respectively).
3.4 Regression  Results
We  have  estimated  two regressions  to assess  the partial
18  We introduced the variable FORFIN (see  Box 1) to test the hypothesis
that donor agencies attempt to encourage pollution abatement efforts through
their lending policies, ceteris paribus.  However, we found that FORFIN
summarized lending activities that occurred over the lives of the plants, some
of which predated the era of international environmental consciousness.
Unfortunately then, FORFIN only provided a weak index of recent pressure by
donors.
21TABLE 6
CORRELATION MATRIX
SCORE  COMPETE  I Ln PCI  I LOCI  LOC2  FORFIN  [  MNC
SCORE  1.00
COMPETE  0.53  1.00
Ln PCI  0.40  0.21  1.00
LOC1  -0.59  -0.13  0.17  1.00
LOC2  -0.01  -0.29  -0.16  -0.32  1.00
FORFIN  -0.62  -0.55  -0.05  0.37  -0.28  1.00
MNC  0.24  0.29  0.02  -0.32  0.06  -0.28  1.00
SOE  -0.17  -0.50  -0.25  -0.02  -0.10  0.54  -0.36
Ln EMP  0.31  0.06  -0.05  -0.29  -0.34  0.24  0.03
EMP  0.33  0.11  0.01  -0.30  -0.28  0.05  -0.04
CLEAN  -0.33  -0.00  0.11  0.52  0.21  -0.12  -0.05
FORMREG  0.25  -0.20  0.39  0.00  0.27  -0.12  -0.13
PRESSURE  0.45  0.12  0.17  -0.31  -0. l5  -0.00  -0.40
SOE  |_Ln EMP  [_EMP  [_CLEAN  |_FORMREG  PRESSURE]|
SOE  1.00
Ln EMP  0.38  1.00
EMP  0.16  0.88  1.00
CLEAN  -0.48  -0.39  -0.33  1.00
FORMREG  -0.11  0.01  0.09  0.00  1.00
PRESSURE  0.47  0.40  0.42  -0.53  0.00  1.00
Notes:
1.  Ln PCI and Ln EMP are the Natural Logs of PCI and EMP.
2.  All variables are defined in Box 1.
22effects  of regulation  and plant  characteristics  on abatement
effort.  The plant  characteristics  include  EMP, MNC,  SOE,  CLEAN,
FORFIN,  COMPETE  and AGE.  (See Box  1.)  The  two versions  differ  in
their  treatment  of informal  regulatory  pressure.  In our  first
regression,  we measure  this  as PRESSURE;  in our  second
regression,  we measure  it as the vector  of  proxies  <ln PCI,  LOC1,
and  LOC2>.  Using  standard  t and F tests,  we eliminated  those
variables  whose  estimated  parameters  were  not  statistically
different  from  zero.  After  hypothesis  testing,  we report  the
final  estimates  for both  regressions  in Table  7.
In the  first  regression,  we find that both  formal  (FORMREG)
and  informal  (PRESSURE)  regulation  have  statistically  important
positive  effects  on abatement  activity  (SCORE).  Given  the
scaling  of the  variables,  the effects  are  about  equal.  Other
factors  affecting  abatement  activity  include  the size  of the
plant  (which  increases  abatement  activities  at a decreasing
rate);  its  relative  competitiveness;  state  ownership  (SOE = 1)
and whether  the process  technology  is 'clean.'  However,  MNC
ownership  has  not  proven  to be significant  in this multivariate
analysis.19  Ceteris  paribus,  more  competitive  plants  are  able  to
undertake  more  substantial  abatement  efforts;  state-owned
enterprises  abate  considerably  less  than privately-owned
enterprises  (whether  local  or multinational);  and plants  with
"clean"  technologies  require  less abatement.
19  Where the same variables are employed, these results are consistent
with those reported in Pargal/Wheeler (1995).
23TABLE 7
REGRESSION RESULTS
REGRESSION 1:  DETERMINANTS OF ABATEMENT EFFORT
Variable  Coefficent  Standard Error  ]t  P>  it!
Variable  Coficn  StnadEroI 
PRESSURE  9.67  4.13  2.34  0.03**
FORMREG  3.36  .95  3.53  0.00**
EMP  .0069  .0028  2.49  0.02**
EMP 2 -1.04e-06  4.12e-07  -2.51  0.02**
COMPETE  3.48  2.02  1.72  0.10*
SOE  -12.79  4.57  -2.79  0.01**
CLEAN  -6.89  3.60  -1.91  0.07*
Number of observations =  22; adj R'  square  =  0.8
*Significant at 10% confidence level.
**Significant at 5% and  1% level.
|REGRESSION  2:  DETERMINANTS OF ABATEMENT EFFORT
l  Variable  Coefficient  I  Standard Error  It  |  P>  it
COMPETE  5.71  1.56  3.64  0.00**
Ln PCI  6.74  2.71  2.48  0.02**
LOCI  -11.94  2.73  -4.36  0.00**
EMP  .0041  .0021  1.95  0.07*
EMP 2 -5.69e-07  3.0Oe-07  -1.83  0.09*
FORMREG  2.99  1.55  1.92  0.07
CONS  -47.21  17.51  -2.69  0.01**
Number of observations  =  20; adj RW  0.7520:  F 6,3 =  10.6
*Significant at  10% confidence level.
**Significant at 5%  and 1 % level.
24When  we use  our proxy  variables  for informal  regulatory
pressures  in Regression  2, we obtain  similar  results.  Formal
regulatory  pressures  are  still  quite  important,  and  the measured
size  of the  effect  is similar  to that  found  in Regression  1.
"Other"  factors  that prove  statistically  important  are  size
(which also  increases  abatement  activities  at a decreasing  rate)
and  competitiveness.  In this  regression,  both  SOE and  CLEAN  are
statistically  insignificant.  The  two proxy  measures  for  informal
regulatory  pressure  that prove  to be statistically  significant
are per  capita  income  and  location  in a large  city  (LOCl). As
discussed  above,  the measured  effect  of LOC1  supports  our
hypothesis  that polluters  in smaller  cities  and  rural  areas  are
more  easily  identified  and  subjected  to localized  informal
pressure. 20
4. SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
In this paper,  we have  analyzed  the  results  of a survey  of
pulp  and paper  plants  in four Asian  developing  countries.  We
find that  both  informal  and  formal  regulation  have  significant
effects  on abatement.  While  our  results  are consistent  with  a
Coasian  interpretation,  we must  defer  any  strong  conclusions
until  more  detailed  survey  work  has been  completed.
4.1  Determinants  of abatement
The  main  message  of our  results  is a hopeful  one  for
20  However, it is important to note that many of the plants in LOC1 have
CLEAN  technologies.  The  fact  that  CLEAN  is statistically  insignificant  in
this  regression  may  be  due  to its collinearity  with  LOC1.
25sustainable  development.  Clean  production  is not uncommon,  even
in very  poor  countries  such as Bangladesh.  Why  are  some
factories  so much  cleaner  than  others?  Some plant
characteristics  clearly  matter  a lot, although  several  of our
prior  hypotheses  have  not  survived  this particular  test.  We  find
that  abatement  is positively  associated  with  scale  and
competitiveness;  negatively  associated  with  pubic  ownership;  and
unaffected  by foreign  links  (in ownership,  financing  or export-
orientation).  Age  of plant  is not  associated  with  greater
abatement  in this  four-country  study,  although  it has  been
significant  in other  studies  (e.g., Pargal  and Wheeler,  1995).
Community  pressure,  or informal  regulation,  emerges  as a
clear  source  of interplant  differences.  Under  some
circumstances,  communities  successfully  pressure  plants  to abate
even  if little  or no support  is available  from  formal  regulation.
Our  results  suggest  that  local  income  is a powerful  predictor  of
effective  informal  regulation.  We also  find that  existing  formal
regulation  has  measurably  beneficial  effects,  even when  it is
weakly-developed.
4.2  General  Policy  Implications
Our  results  suggest  that  several  trends  in developing
countries  will  encourage  pollution  abatement.  The  current  wave
of privatization  implies  declining  significance  for pollution-
intensive  state-owned  enterprises.  Deregulation  during  the
1980's  has presumably  increased  plant-level  efficiency  in the
26private  sector,  with  significant  improvements  in environmental
performance.  Per  capita  incomes  are also  advancing  steadily  in
many Asian  and  Latin  American  countries,  raising  the  likelihood
of stronger  local  pressure  on many polluting  facilities.
If cross-section  results  can be extrapolated  to time  series,
continuation  of such trends  should  be associated  with  a
significant  increase  in abatement  activity,  no matter  what
happens  in the  formal  regulatory  sector.  Furthermore,  this
predicted  effect  does  not  depend  on any  increased  presence  of
foreign,  putatively  'green,'  firms.  More multinational  plants
will  certainly  open  in the developing  world,  but  our  evidence
suggests  that  their  environmental  performance  will  be matched  by
domestic  firms  which  are otherwise  comparable.
Our  findings  on the  strength  of informal  regulation  seem
particularly  significant.  An  important  role  for this  factor
would  have  several  implications  for environmental  policy  in
developing  countries.  First,  widespread  informal  regulation
represents  a promising  foundation  for decentralized  regulatory
policy.  In the  textbook  paradigm  of environmental  economics,
optimal  pollution  loads  and  emissions  charges  should  vary  across
communities  because  local  conditions  create  different  marginal
benefit  and  cost  schedules  for abatement.
Our  results  suggest  that this  is true of informal  regulation
as well.  New  formal  regulatory  systems  may be  able to build  on
such  local  arrangements  rather  than replacing  them at
unnecessarily  high  cost.  The  imposition  of a national  system  of
27uniform  standards  might,  in fact,  create  enough  deviation  from
locally-optimal  standards  to reduce  welfare  in some
communities.  Second,  and  arguably  more  important,  our  results
suggest  that  community  income  is a key  determinant  of  informal
regulatory  outcomes.  Communities  whose  citizens  are mostly  poor,
poorly  educated  or members  of marginalized  minority  groups  may
have  little  ability  to use  the available  channels  of informal
regulation.  Thus,  our  results  imply  that  'environmental
injustice'  may be an important  problem  in developing  countries.
To compensate,  formal  regulation  could  be targeted  particularly
on pollution  control  problems  of poor  communities.
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31APPENDIX  A:  Variable  Construction
The  Dependent  Variable:  Abatement  Effort  Score
For  this  study  we have  constructed  an index  of relative
effort  and  financial  resources  committed  to pollution  abatement.
The  index  summarizes  both  the quality  of the abatement  technique
employed  and  the  installation  cost  of the  relevant  plant  and
equipment.  The  index  does not  account  for the possibility  that
the  abatement  facilities  may  not be properly  or efficiently  used.
Nor  does  it include  variable  costs  of operation  (labor, materials
and  replacement  parts).
The  ten  abatement  techniques  included  in our  index,  which
are  all  end-of-pipe,  are the  following:
*  Air  pollution  abatement  methods
1.  Electrostatic  precipitator  (EP) or filter  bag
*  Water  pollution  abatement  methods
2.  Lagoon  treatment
3.  Clarifier
4.  Aerobic  treatment
5.  Anaerobic  treatment
6.  Chemical  treatment  (coagulant/flocculin)
7.  Water  recycling
8.  Liquor  recovery
*  Solid  waste  disposal  methods
9.  Compaction  of solid  residuals
*  General  abatement  efforts
10.  Good  housekeeping  practices  for resource  recovery
and  recycling
We characterized  each of these  ten  techniques  or practices
by  the  following  two  criteria  (with their  appropriate  score):
*  Relative  costliness  of the  abatement  method  and/or
facility
*s  Low  cost  (Score  =  1)
*s  Moderate  cost  (Score  =  2)
32No  High  cost  (Score  =  3)
*  Relative  quality  of abatement  facility  installation
ME  Standard  installation  (Score  =  2)
No  Inferior  installation  (Score  =  1)
ME  No  installation  (Score  =  0)
The  grading  of the ten  abatement  methods  by degree  of
costliness  is as follows:
Abatement  Method  Score
*  Electrostatic  precipitator  (EP)  3
*  Filter  bag  2
*  Lagoon  treatment  1
*  Clarifier  2
*  Aerobic  treatment  3
*  Anaerobic  treatment  1
*  Chemical  treatment  3
*  Water  recycling  1
*  Liquor  recovery  1
*  Compaction  or pressing  of solids  2
*  Good  housekeeping  practices  1
If a given  facility  uses  inferior  implementation  procedures,
it will  incur  lower  costs.  For example,  standard  aerobic
treatment  involves  concrete  holding  tanks  and  sufficient  aerating
equipment.  Inferior  implementation  procedures  make use  of
earthen  holding  ponds  and minimal  aerating  equipment.
We  reflect  this  relative  quality  by multiplying  the  score
for the  expense  of the abatement  technique  by the  score  for
relative  quality  of implementation.  Thus,  aerobic  treatment
facilities  are  generally  expensive  (Score  =  3).  If  a particular
installation  reflects  standard  installation  criteria,  we give  it
an overall  Score  of 3*2 =  6.  Sub-standard  installation  of
aerobic  facilities  receives  a Score  = 3*1 =  3, while  the  absence
of aerobic  facilities  generates  a Score  of  0*3 =  0.
The  total  score  given  each plant  is the sum  of the  scores
for each  possible  abatement  method.  If a surveyed  plant  had
implemented  all abatement  methods  using  standard  installation
procedures,  the  score  for that plant  would  be 36: the maximum
score  attainable.  The minimum  score  is obviously  0.
Table  Al  summarizes  the  scores  for each of our  26 survey
plants.  The  plants  are  listed  in ascending  order  of abatement
effort.  While  there  may  be some disagreement  about  whether  a
33plant  with  a score  of 9 had  implemented  more  extensive  and more
costly  abatement  procedures  than  a plant  with  a score  of  8, we
think  the  scores  provide  a reasonable  grouping  of plants
according  to relative  abatement  investment.
Selected  Independent  Variables
The  variable  COMPETE  is used  to identify  relative  cost
competitiveness  (0, 1 or 2; see Box  1 in the  text)  of each  plant.
We ascertained  this value  by asking  each  survey  respondent  to
rank  the  competitiveness  of his/her  own plant  and all  other
plants  in the  region.  Since  there  were  usually  only  a few paper
producers  in any given  country,  each plant  manager  could  respond.
To avoid  any  strategic  response  bias,  we corroborated  the
response  of each  manager  concerning  his/her  own plant  using  the
responses  of the managers  of other  plants.
As noted  in the paper,  NATREG  AND  PROVREG  are  measures  of
relative  strictness  for national  and provincial  regulation.
Table  2A summarizes  the plant  sample  and  scores  by country  and
province.
34TABLE  Al
THE  CONSTRUCTED  INDEX SCORE  OF THE  SURVEYED PAPER  PLANTS
EP or  Press
Plant  rilter  Aerobic  Anaerobic  Coagulant/  Water  House  Liquor  for
Number  bag  Lagoon  Clarifier  Treatment  Treatment  flocculin  Recycling  keeping  Recovery  Solids  Score
1
2
311
4  1
5  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1  2  3
6  11  2  4
7  2  1  2  5
8  2  2  2  6
9  6  17
10  2  3  1  2  8
11  6  2  8
12  2  2  3  1  1  9
13  1  4  6  1  1  13
14  4  6  1  2  13
15  4  6  2  2  14
16  4  4  6  2  1  2  19
17  6  1  2  6  2  2  19
18  6  1  4  6  4  21
19  6  1  2  6  6  2  23
20  6  1  4  6  1  3  2  1  24
35EP or  T  T  l  T  1  Press
Plant  filter  Aerobic  Anaerobic  Coagulant/  Water  House  Liquor  for
Number  bag  Lagoon  Clarifier  Treatment  Treatment  flocculin  Recyclng  keeping  Recovery  Solids  Score
21  6  2  4  6  2  2  2  4  26
22  6  2  4  6  2  2  2  4  28
23  6  2  4  6  2  6  1  2  29
24  4  2  4  6  2  6  1  1  4  30
25  6  2  4  6  2  6  2  1  2  31
26  6  2  4  6  2  6  1  1  4  32
Highest
Possible
Score  6  2  4  6  2  6  2  2  2  4  36
36TABLE A2
NATREG,  PROVREG,  FORMREG  By Country  and  Region
Country  NATREG  PROVREG  FORMREG  No. of Plants
INDONESIA
Surabaya  3  1  4  4
Rest  of Indonesia  3  0  3  6
INDIA
Maharashtra  3  1  4  3
Kerala  3  0  3  1
Karnataka  3  0  3  2
West Bengal  3  -1  2  3
THAILAND  3  0  3  3
BANGLADESH  1  0  1  4
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